

Battleship Victory Principles Of Sea Power In The War In The Pacific

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Almost seventy-five years after the Japanese sank six US battleships at Pearl Harbor, Historian Robert Lundgren provides a startling reassessment of the role of battleships in World War II. Far from "being made obsolete in a single day," Lundgren upends the conventional wisdom by showing that the battle line was an essential tool for the exercise of seapower all the way to V-J Day. Indeed, he argues, the Japanese Navy's undue reliance on aircraft carriers alone was a key factor in its loss of command of the sea. From the introduction: "Human perception is human reality and I offer a different perspective on battleships by applying the principles of several naval and military thinkers, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett that may change the perception that battleships became obsolete? By the end of the World War Two the aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the reigning queen of the seas. No new battleships designs were created leaving the last four Iowa class battleships to be the last of their kind to serve the United States. What role did battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and submarines play in the United States victory and Japan's defeat during the Second World War? I will argue here that, contrary to conventional wisdom, battleships continued to play a decisive role throughout the war." Through a meticulous examination of the operational details of every major battle in the War in the Pacific, Lundgren illuminates how the US prevailed with a "combined arms" approach that made use of all the particular capabilities of aircraft carriers, battleships, and submarines. Only in this way could a navy follow the fundamental principles of sea power identified by Mahan and Corbett. This is a must read for anyone who thinks they know the history of the War in the Pacific. A wonderful gift that will spark many debates among battleship and naval aviation enthusiasts alike. Robert Lundgren is also the author of *The World Wonder'd: What Really Happened Off Samar* (Nimble 2014). Eight tables, 700 footnotes.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783

A classic work covering over 2,000 years of naval history, from Greek and Roman galley warfare to Vietnam.

Sea Power

Japanese Carriers and Victory in the Pacific focuses on the pre-war debate between building a new generation of super-battleships or adopting aircraft carriers as the 'capital ships' of the future. An Asian power in particular sees carriers as a way of challenging the USA and the colonial empires initially losing the contest yet coming out all right in the Cold War aftermath. Martin Stansfeld examines the much overlooked genesis of Japan's so-called shadow fleet that was a secret attempt to bring about parity with the US in carriers -- albeit only with slower speed conversions of liners and auxiliaries but along with the super-battleships cluttered launch facilities when these could have been devoted to keel-up fast fleet carrier production. This first analytical look at what major launch facilities were available in Japan shows that the Imperial Japanese Navy could have doubled its fast carrier fleet thereby able to give sufficient air cover for an invasion of Hawaii rather than just the raid on Pearl Harbor, but only providing nobody noticed they were building all these carriers. This is shown to have been entirely possible given the IJN's extraordinary success at covering up their super-battleship and shadow fleet production. This secret fast carrier fleet program is given the name 'phantom fleet' by Stansfeld who proceeds to demonstrate how the strategy of the Pacific War would have been transformed. Weaving through the chapters is an exotic cast of characters led most notably by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the conceiver of Pearl Harbor and a figure of mythic status to Japanese today and famous around the world thanks to the movies. Stansfeld dwells on the ironies of war, notably how, without the 'day that will live in infamy', America might never have become the worldwide super-power it is today.

Japanese Carriers and Victory in the Pacific

This book examines the strategic choices that American and Chinese decisionmakers face regarding sea power in the Western Pacific, shaped by geography, history, technology, and politics. In particular, the author explores the potential for cooperation on maritime security in the Western Pacific, and how the United States might pursue such cooperation as part of a broader strategy to advance its interests in the region.

Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific

A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not the least, the way the sea service defines itself and its way of war. This book is a history of the modern U.S. Navy. It explains how the Navy, in the century after 1890, was formed and reformed in the interaction of purpose, experience, and doctrine.

A Guide to Naval Strategy

It is a century since Mahan and his disciples taught the world that a battlefleet was indispensable to a great power. Great and not-so-great powers still keep powerful navies today, but we have no generally accepted principles to explain why. In this book historians and naval officers from Britain, the United States and other countries study the use of naval power over the present century, and ask what it is for, and what it can do. It will be essential reading for modern historians, policy-makers and strategists.

One Hundred Years of Sea Power

The Pacific Theater in World War II depended on American sea power. This power was refined between 1923 and 1940, when the U.S. Navy held twenty-one major fleet exercises designed to develop strategy and allow officers to enact plans in an operational setting. Prior to 1923, naval officers relied heavily on the theories of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued that sea control was vital to military victory, best attained through use of the battleship. Fleet exercises, however, allowed valuable practice with other military resources and theories. As a direct result of these exercises, the navy incorporated different technologies and updated its own outdated strategies. Although World War II brought unforeseen challenges and the disadvantages of simulation exercises quickly became apparent, fleet "problems" may have opened the door to different ideas that allowed the U.S. Navy ultimately to succeed. Testing American Sea Power challenges the conventional wisdom that Mahanian theory held the American Navy in a steel grip. Felker's research and analysis, the first to concentrate on the navy's interwar exercises, will make a valuable contribution to naval history for historians, military professionals, and naval instructors.

Naval Power in the Twentieth Century

In Post-war Japan as a Sea Power, Alessio Patalano incorporates new, exclusive source material to develop an innovative approach to the study of post-war Japan as a military power. This archival-based history of Asia's most advanced navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), looks beyond the traditional perspective of viewing the modern Japanese military in light of the country's alliance with the US. The book places the institution in a historical context, analysing its imperial legacy and the role of Japan's shattering defeat in WWII in the post-war emergence of Japan as East Asia's 'sea power'.

The Future of Sea Power in the Pacific

A brilliant, concise and, perhaps, best single volume history of the Second World War at Sea. Written by veteran historian E. B. Potter during his time as resident historian

at the United States Naval Academy this history is filled with action and analysis. As the conflict raged from the Pacific to the North Sea the author takes the action in each theater for the purposes of clarity but masterfully links the actions and events together to preserve the historical integrity of the work. A classic of Naval History.

Testing American Sea Power

The British Pacific Fleet was formed in October 1944 and dispatched to fight alongside the USN in the Central Pacific under Admiral Nimitz. Deploying previously unpublished documents, this book reveals how relations between the UK and US forces developed from a starting point of barely repressed suspicion, to one where both navies came to understand each other and eventually find a remarkable bond. Born out of a shared experience of Kamikaze attacks, extended operations against bitterly hostile shores, the pooling of knowledge and experience, the two navies underpinned the diplomatic moves in both Washington and London. The book carries the legacy of this experience through to the next Anglo-American participation in war, Korea. It illustrates and explains how and why certain lessons were incorporated into the composition, behaviour and structure of the post-war Navy. It demonstrates the significance of what was learned from the USN by the RN and by USN from the RN. As well as examining the background to the largest fleet the Royal Navy ever put to sea, the book also charts its effects on Anglo-American relations, multinational operations, alliance building, and the ways naval forces are shaped by and in turn shape politics. It addresses a period of rapid technological development that witnessed profound changes in the international system, and which raised fundamental questions of what navies were for and how should they operate and organize themselves. In so doing the study illustrates how the experience of a few long months at the end of the war in the Pacific would cast a long shadow over these issues in the very different circumstances of the post-war world.

Sea-power in the Pacific

This is an in-depth study of the battle of Midway that reviews the many previous accounts and compares their accuracy and veracity with fresh documentation that has been released recently, including new material on the post-war analysis made by a US select committee. There are new viewpoints on the muddle among the US Admirals; the total failure of the USAAF, despite elaborate claims; fresh thinking on the part played by the US Navy Dauntless dive-bombers in the action; the mystery of the carrier Saratoga's presence; Hollywood's totally wrong take on the battle in all the films since made about it. Also, included are new eyewitness accounts the author has obtained and information from Japanese sources that has never been previously published. The lengthy Appendices will include statistical details of the ships, the planes and the men.

Post-war Japan as a Sea Power

Application of Admiral Mahan's theories of sea power to the history of naval operations in the World War.

The 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of "command of the sea" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm.

The Great Sea War: The Story Of Naval Action In World War II

"To win in the Pacific during World War II, the U.S. Navy had to transform itself technically, tactically, and strategically. It had to create a fleet capable of the unprecedented feat of fighting and winning far from home, without existing bases, in the face of an enemy with numerous bases fighting in his own waters. Much of the credit for the transformation should go to the war gaming conducted at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, as we face further demands for transformation, the inter-war experience at the War College offers valuable guidance as to what works, and why, and how."

The British Pacific Fleet Experience and Legacy, 1944-50

On Seas Contested is an in-depth analysis of the Second World War's seven major navies. A team of expert naval historians have contributed chapters outlining the navies of the United States, the United Kingdom and Commonwealth, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and the Soviet Union. Each chapter consistently details key features such as weaponry, training, logistics, and doctrine. This definitive work will be a standard reference for years to come.

Midway: Dauntless Victory

In his excellent book explaining naval strategy, Julian S. Corbett examines sound maritime strategy. Crucially, he advances the view that navies could perform much better if their role in assisting land warfare and amphibious forces were increased. Writing in the early 20th century, Corbett draws upon centuries of naval battles and identifies several common strains. The development of war strategies at sea often entailed trial and error - the author elects to explain how strategy evolved as much from calamity as practice. How naval force should be assembled, how it should form up, and how concentrations and dispersal of ships should be organized each receive discussion. Although naval warfare has substantially changed since this book's original publication, it continues to be consulted for its timeless and sound advice. Corbett's era predated the extensive use of submarines and aeroplanes in naval combat, but his conclusions remain sound and sought after even in the tutoring of modern maritime strategy.

The Influence of Sea Power in World War II.

In the five months after Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy won a string of victories in a campaign to consolidate control of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. In June of 1942, Japan suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Midway and was never again able to take the offensive in the Pacific. Bringing fresh perspective to the battle and its consequences, the author identifies Japan's operational plan as a major factor in its Navy's demise and describes the profound effects Midway had on the course of the war in Europe.

American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory

\[Volume 1] Traces the social issues, technological advances, and combative encounters of the international naval race from 1890 through WWI, as the largest industrial nations (U.S, Great Britain, Japan, and Germany) scrambled to secure global markets and empire, using their battleship navies as pawns of power politics\"--
Provided by publisher.

Why Sea Power Will Win the War

Refighting the Pacific War looks at how World War II in the Pacific might have unfolded differently, giving historians, authors and veterans the opportunity to discuss what happened and what might have happened. Contributors to this alternative history include noted military historians William Bartsch, John Burton, Donald Goldstein, John Lundstrom, Robert Mrazek, Jon Parshall, Douglas Smith, Peter Smith, Barrett Tillman, Anthony Tully, and H. P. Willmott. In all more than thirty Pacific War experts will provide commentary, employing a roundtable panel discussion format. The reader will hear from the experts on how history could and could not have been

altered during the course of the war in the Pacific. With multiple opinions, the reader will be provided with an interesting collection of divergent views about the outcome of the war. Refighting the Pacific War focuses largely on naval battles and campaigns, including Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. While the main concentration is on the major naval actions, the book also delves into key island battles, like Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, as well as pre-war and post-war political issues. The panelists debate questions like whether the Japanese could have inflicted even greater damage on the U. S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and how Yamamoto might have won at Midway and how such a victory might have impacted the direction of the war. The book extensively studies the opening year of the war when the Japanese war machine seemed unstoppable. Also explored is whether the Pacific War was inevitable and whether the conflict could have ended without the use of the atomic bomb. Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (Ret.), provides the book's Introduction.

Winning a Future War

Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1660--1783) was one of the most influential books on military strategy in the first half of the 20th century. A core text in the naval war colleges of the United States, Britain, and Japan, Mahan's book shaped doctrine for the conduct of war at sea. Adams uses Mahan's ideas to discuss the great Pacific sea battles of World War II and to consider how well they withstood the test of actual combat. Reexamining the conduct of war in the Pacific from a single analytic viewpoint leads to some surprising conclusions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the recapture of the Philippines, and the submarine war. Naval historians and armchair strategists alike will find much food for thought in these engrossing pages.

Sea Power and Its Meaning

This concise but exhaustive treatment of sea powers examines the strengths and weaknesses of maritime power, including chapters on mutiny, blockades, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, piracy, commerce raiding, and soft power operations. Throughout, Elleman analyzes the competition between land power and sea power strategies.

On Seas Contested

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Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

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Victory at Midway

Rear Admiral Raja Menon contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. He develops the argument that navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to political objectives, and outlines future strategies.

Power at Sea

World War II laid the groundwork for much of the international system that exists today, especially in the Pacific Rim. This brief but comprehensive survey of the War in the Pacific incorporates both United States and Japanese perspectives, providing a global approach to the Asian theater of the conflict. Drawing on decades of new scholarship and written in an engaging, narrative style, this book traces United States-Japanese relations from the late nineteenth century to the war's end in 1945. It covers every aspect of the war, and gives special attention to ongoing historical debates over key issues. The book also provides new details of many facets of the conflict, including expansionism during the 1930s, events and policies leading up to the war, the importance of air power and ground warfare, military planning and strategic goals, the internment of Japanese-Americans in the U.S., Allied plans and disputes over

Russian participation, the decision to drop the atomic bomb, and conditions for surrender.

Refighting the Pacific War

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1921 edition. Excerpt: ... CHAPTER IV THE UNITED STATES NAVY: MEN AND MATERIAL The personnel of the United States Navy underwent a very great expansion during the late war. On the 1st of April 1917, the establishment numbered 4376 officers and 62,667 men; by the 1st of November 1918, it had increased to 10,400 officers and 220,000 men. Within the same period the naval reserve forces, which were practically non-existent in April 1917, had reached the imposing total of 20,000 officers and 285,000 men. No sooner had the Armistice been signed than demobilisation set in at an extraordinary pace. Twelve months later the reserves had disappeared and the regular establishment had been reduced to 160,000 officers and men, a total insufficient to provide complements for all the ships remaining in commission. At this date the authorities endeavoured to check the rapid wastage of man-power by launching a vigorous recruiting campaign. Apparently it did not meet with great success, for in March 1920 it was admitted by the Secretary that the establishment was down to 103,000 men. A few months before this he had informed the Naval Committee of Congress that the Fleet would be seriously crippled if its personnel were reduced to 150,000. The gravity of the crisis which had thus arisen in regard to the supply of men was revealed by Rear-Admiral Washington, chief of the Bureau of Navigation, in his evidence before the committee in April 1920. The deficiency, he said, amounted to 3765 officers and 68,000 men. The recruiting staff had been enlarged to a figure never previously attained, but in spite of this the retirements, monthly discharges, and desertions far exceeded the number of new recruits enlisted. For the Battle Fleet alone a total of 1500 regular officers was required, ..

If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War

A comprehensive biography of the most powerful naval officer in the history of the United States who was the controversial architect of the American victory in the Pacific. Someone once asked Admiral Ernest J. King if it was he who said, "\"When they get in trouble they send for the sonsabitches.\"" He replied that he was not - —but that he would have said it if he had thought of it. Although never accused of having a warm personality, Ernest J. King commanded the respect of everyone familiar with his work. His is one of the great American naval careers, his place in history forever secured by a remarkable contribution to the Allied victory in the Second World War. "\"Lord how I need him,\"" wrote Navy Secretary Frank Knox on December 23, 1941, the day he summoned King to take control of the Navy at its lowest point, the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Raised in a stern Calvinist home in Lorain, Ohio, Ernest King grew interested in a naval career after reading an article in a boys' magazine.

After graduating from Annapolis fourth in his class (1901), King's early career was "rather ordinary" according to biographer Robert W. Love. But in 1909, at the end of a stint as a drillmaster at the Naval Academy, King distinguished himself by writing an influential essay entitled, "Organization on Board Ship." King performed well in a number of commands between 1914 and 1923, when he began a three-year stint as commander of the submarine base at New London, Connecticut. In 1926 his career took an important turn: he completed the shortened flight course at Pensacola, and from that point on, he would see aviation as the decisive element in naval warfare. This conviction deepened when he served as assistant bureau chief under Rear Admiral William Moffett, widely considered the father of American naval aviation. King's career received another boost when he ably commanded his first aircraft carrier, the Lexington, in the early 1930s. But as his prospects for advancement increased, so did his reputation as a difficult character. "He was meaner than hell," commented one junior officer, reflecting the general opinion that King was as much despised as he was respected. This didn't seem to bother him, though. Love observed that he "seemed almost to pride himself on the fact that he had earned his rank solely on his merits as a professional naval officer, rather than as a result of the friendship of others." In the spring of 1939, the sixty-year-old King coveted the job of Chief of Naval Operations. But his personality and decided lack of political skill or tact led President Roosevelt to pass him over in favor of Admiral Harold Stark. Seemingly banished to duty on the General Board in Washington, King's career was resurrected by the war that soon started in Europe. When Stark grew dissatisfied with the commander of his Atlantic Squadron, he looked to King, who took over in December, 1940. With his slogan "do all that we can with what we have," King ably managed the undeclared war with Germany's U-boats. Although his command was limited to the Atlantic, it brought him to Washington frequently and he stayed abreast of developments in the Pacific. The morning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stark called him to Washington; soon after he was running the Navy —first as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, soon adding the title Chief of Naval Operations, making him the first man to combine both jobs. In the early months of 1942, King's strategic brilliance earned him the complete confidence of President Roosevelt. When none of the British or American war planners even dared to think of going on the offensive in the Pacific in 1942-43, King successfully lobbied to do just that. "No fighter ever won his fight by covering up —merely fending off the other fellow's blows," he wrote. "The winner hits and keeps on hitting even though he has to be able to take some stiff blows in order to keep on hitting." It's easy to see why even those who despised Ernest King were glad he was on their side.

The Strategy of Sea Power

"This concise but exhaustive treatment of sea powers examines the strengths and weaknesses of maritime power, including chapters on mutiny, blockades, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, piracy, commerce raiding, and soft power operations. Throughout, Elleman analyzes the competition between land power and sea power strategies"

Principles of Maritime Power

This revised, updated and expanded new edition of Geoffrey Till's acclaimed textbook provides an invaluable guide for anyone interested in the changing and crucial role of seapower in the twenty-first century.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy: A Theory of War on the High Seas; Naval Warfare and the Command of Fleets

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U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific - Scholar's Choice Edition

Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars

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